GATT and NFTA v. The Helms-Burton Act: Has the United States Violated Multilateral Agreements by Welke, Brian J.
Tulsa Journal of Comparative and International Law
Volume 4 | Issue 2 Article 8
3-1-1997
GATT and NFTA v. The Helms-Burton Act: Has
the United States Violated Multilateral Agreements
Brian J. Welke
Follow this and additional works at: http://digitalcommons.law.utulsa.edu/tjcil
Part of the Law Commons
This Casenote/Comment is brought to you for free and open access by TU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Tulsa Journal
of Comparative and International Law by an authorized administrator of TU Law Digital Commons. For more information, please contact daniel-
bell@utulsa.edu.
Recommended Citation
Brian J. Welke, GATT and NFTA v. The Helms-Burton Act: Has the United States Violated Multilateral Agreements, 4 Tulsa J. Comp. &
Int'l L. 361 (1996).
Available at: http://digitalcommons.law.utulsa.edu/tjcil/vol4/iss2/8
GATT AND NAFTA v. THE HELMS-BURTON
ACT: HAS THE UNITED STATES VIOLATED
MULTILATERAL AGREEMENTS?
I. INTRODUCTION
Although the Castro Government has survived for over thirty-six
years, with the fall of the Soviet Union the regime has attempted to
save its socialist state, ironically, by introducing a limited amount of
capitalism. In addition, recently Castro has cautiously allowed a small
amount of foreign investors into Cuba.'
But in an attempt to thwart Castro's efforts, the United States Con-
gress passed and the President signed the Cuban Liberty and Democrat-
ic Solidarity (Libertad) Act (the "Helms-Burton Act" or the "Act") on
March 12, 1996.2 Although the Act strengthens international sanctions
against Cuba and makes investors decide whether they want to trade
with the United States or Cuba,3 its overall objective is to remove Cas-
tro from power in Cuba and give the Cuban people the opportunity to
experience the democratic process.'
1. See Jorge L. Dominguez, The Americas: Helms Bill on Cuba Won't Hasten Democratic
Transition, WALL ST. J., April 28, 1995, at 13. "Castro has publicly stated that he hates to do
what he feels he now has to do. He has [done so] ... because he finds himself stuck, cornered,
[and] compelled."
2. 22 U.S.C.A. §§ 6021-91 (Supp. Hl 1996). Cuban Liberty and Democratic Solidarity
(Libertad) Act [hereinafter CLDS].
3. 22 U.S.C.A. §§ 6081-91. Subchapters In and IV imply that the United States wants
foreign investors to decide whether they want to trade with the United States or Cuba.
4. Although § 6022(3) of the Act does not explicitly state that its objective is to oust
Castro, the fatal effect amounts to that. Purposes include:
[A]ssist[ing] the Cuban people in regaining their freedom and prosperity, as
well as in joining the community of democratic countries that are flourishing
in the Western Hemisphere, .. . strengthen[ing] international sanctions against
the Castro govermnent,... provid[ing] for the continued national security of
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The Act attempts to meet its objective by: prohibiting any product
that ever touched Cuban soil from entering the United States; allowing
United States nationals to sue any foreign person who profits from
property confiscated by Castro; and denying to any person who profits
from confiscated property a visa to enter the United States.5 Since its
passage, Canada6 and Mexico, and the European Union (EU) have
raised concern over whether the Act violates the North American Free
Trade Agreement (NAFTA)7 and the General Agreement on Tariffs and
Trade (GATT),8 respectively. This comment analyzes whether the Act
violates NAFTA and GATT. Although I only address the EU concern-
ing GATT, the analysis applies to all GAYT members except Canada
and Mexico. These two countries have chosen to attack the Act under
NAFTA.
the United States in the face of continuing threats from the Castro govern-
ment of terrorism, theft of property from United States nationals by the Castro
government, and the political manipulation by the Castro government of the
desire of Cubans to escape that results in mass migration to the United
States.... encouraging the holding of free and fair democratic elections in
Cuba, conducted under the supervision of internationally recognized observ-
ers .... provid[ing] a policy frame work for United States support to the
Cuban people in response to the formation of a transition government or a
democratically elected government in Cuba,... and protect[ing] United
States nationals against confiscatory takings and the wrongful trafficking in
property confiscated by the Castro regime. 22 U.S.C.A. § 6022(3) (Supp. IH
1996).
5. CLDS, supra note 2. Section 6040 of the Act prohibits any merchandise from entering
the United States that is of Cuban origin, has been located in or transported through Cuba, or is
made from an article that was grown, produced, or manufactured in Cuba. Section 6082 of the
Act provides a civil remedy to those United States nationals whose property Castro confiscated
and a foreigner profits from. Section 6091 denies entry into the United States to anyone who
profits from the confiscated property of a United States national.
6. In recent years, Canadian companies have been among the most active foreign investors
in Cuba. See Peter Zirnite, U.S.-Cuba: Pressure Mounts on Clinton to Waive Helms-Burton,
INTER PRESS SERV., June 14, 1996, at 1. One company in particular, Sherritt International, has
been extremely successful. It has a joint venture in nickel mining in Cuba, and expects to boost
its operation in eastern Cuba with a $150 million investment. See Rick Haliechuk, U.S. to
Blacklist Toronto Miner over Cuban Venture, MONTREAL GAZETTE, June 23, 1995, at D3.
However, Sherritt has been targeted by the United States Treasury Department, which notified
the company that it is prohibited from dealing with any United States nationals. See CUBA:
U.S. Blacklists Canadian Mining Firm, CARIBBEAN UPDATE, Aug. 1, 1995, available in 1995
WL 2297183.
7. The North American Free Trade Agreement, Dec. 17, 1992, 32 I.L.M. 289 [hereinafter
NAFTA].




Any discussion concerning the United States trade embargo against
Cuba must begin in 1959. In that year Fidel Castro became the dictator
of Cuba, and although he did not announce that he was a Marxist-Le-
ninist until the end of 1961, he began socializing the economy in
1959.' The Castro Government passed several laws socializing the
Cuban economy, but between 1959 and 1960 the Cuban Government
passed the Land Reform Act which essentially confiscated property of
foreigners.' ° Also, in response to the United States suspension of Cu-
ban import quotas of sugar, Castro announced the expropriation of all
United States-owned property in Cuba."
Ever since 1963, the United States has had an embargo against
Cuba. 2 However, it did not have a severe effect on the island nation
until the demise of the Soviet Union. 3 Today, more than 650 foreign
companies have invested in excess of 2.1 billion dollars in Cuba. 4
Although Castro is "highly suspicious" of foreign capitol, he wants the
foreign investment."i Cuba has announced that the Act has not affected
its economy, 6 but it has announced that the embargo has hurt poten-
tial investors who are waiting to see what will happen."
9. See INTERNATIONAL COMMISSION OF JURISTS, CUBA AND THE RULE OF LAW 6 (1962).
10. See id. at 5.
11. See id. See also Dances with Wolves, ECONOMIST, Apr. 6, 1996, at 1. Officially the Cu-
bans seized about six million dollars, but unofficially, the estimates are sixty billion dollars.
12. See Cuban Assets Control Regulations 31 C.F.R. § 515.204 (1996). See also Dances
with Wolves, supra note 11, at 1. Cuba figures that the embargo has cost about forty-four bil-
lion dollars.
13. See Dances with Wolves, supra note 11, at 1. See also 141 CONG. REC. H9328, 9338
(daily ed. Sept. 20, 1995) (statement of Rep. Diaz-Belart). The Soviets subsidized the Cuban
economy with about six billion dollars annually.
14. See Their Men in Havana, ECONOMIST, Apr. 6, 1996, at 1. Investors Pour Millions into
Cuba, Tourists Spur Island's Economy, SAN DIEoO UNION-TRn., Apr. 28, 1996, at 12. Al-
though sugar was once Cuba's mainstay, its production is down 55 percent. Tourism, however,
is thriving. In 1995 nearly three quarter of a million tourists from Europe, Canada, and Latin
America visited the Island and they spent $1.1 billion. Cuba expects those numbers to rise, and
more than double within four years.
15. Investors Pour Millions into Cuba, Tourists Spur Island's Economy, supra note 14, at 2.
Cuba's Business Laws Puts Off Foreigners, WALL ST. J., Oct. 10, 1995, at 16. Since 1990
foreign investment has amounted to $736.9 million. The major investors are Mexico ($250
million), Spain ($125 million), Canada ($100 million), Italy ($87 million), U.K. ($50 million),
and the Netherlands ($40 million).
16. See Gary Borg, Havana: U.S. Law Having no Effect, Cm. TRm., June 7, 1996, avail-
able in 1996 WL 2678941, at 1. Cuban officials stated that as of June 6, 1996, no foreign in-
vestors have pulled out.
17. See The Cuban Liberty and Democratic Solidarity Act, 142 CONG. RFC. E371-01, E371
(1996). Cuba's foreign minister denounced the Act as a "law against humanity," and stated that
foreign investors would be "daring" to invest in Cuba now because of the potential of it being
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In December of 1994, after the Republicans took control of the
United States Senate, Senator Jesse Helms, Chairman of the Foreign
Relations Committee, hinted that he wanted Americans who had their
property seized by Castro compensated by countries that benefit from
it. 8 Senator Helms introduced a bill tightening sanctions against Cuba
by barring aid to countries that help Cuba. 9 The Cuban Liberty and
Democratic Solidarity (Libertad) Act passed in the House,' and a
"watered-down" version passed in the Senate2 on September 21, 1995
and October 25, 1995, respectively. But on February 24, 1996, Cuban
Migs shot down two unarmed "Brothers to the Rescue"'  planes, kill-
ing four people.' Although President Clinton vigorously opposed the
bill originally, he announced on February 26, 1996, that he would work
with Congress to find a compromise.24 After a conference with the
Clinton Administration, the Senate, on March 5, 1996, passed a confer-
ence report which included tough new sanctions.' The President
signed the bill on March 12, 1996.2 He stated that the Act "is a clear
statement of our determination to respond to attacks on United States
nationals and of our continued commitment to stand by the Cuban
people in their peaceful struggle for freedom."' Within days of the
signing, both Mexico and Canada announced they were going to chal-
"in the pipeline."
18. See id. at E371. The legislation has been in the United States Congress for a year, but
the downing of the two civilian aircrafts gave it a tremendous boost.
19. See Helms and Cuba Sanctions, N.Y. Timms, Feb. 9, 1995, at 5.
20. See House Approves Cuba Liberty Act to Tighten Embargo Against Castro, 12 INT'L
TRADE REP. 1606 (1995).
21. Senate Passes Watered-Down Cuba Bill After Property Provision Dropped, 12 INT'L
TRADE RE'. 1771 (1995).
22. "Brothers to the Rescue" is a Cuban exile group that flies over the Florida Straits look-
ing for Cuban refugees and advocates the military overthrow of Castro.
23. See Kevin Fedarko & Tammerlin Drummon, This Cold War is Back as U.S.-Cuba Rela-
tions Hit a New Low, Castro Tells Why His Air Force Shot Down Civilians, TIME, Mar. 11,
1996, at 36.
24. See Clinton Says He Will Try To Reach Compromise on Helms-Burton Cuba Bill, 13
INT'L TRADE REP. 332 (1996).
25. See New U.S. Legislation on Cuba Trade May Violate NAFTA, Canadian Aide Says, 13
INT'L TRADE REP. 368 (1996). The Senate passed the House-Senate conference report by a vote
of 74-22.
26. See President Signs Cuba Sanctions Bill After it Passes House by Big Margin, 13 INT'L
TRADE REP. 421 (1996). The bill passed in the House by a vote of 336-86.
27. Statement by President William J. Clinton Upon Signing H.R. 927, 32 WEEKLY COWE.
OF PREs. Doc. 479 (Mar. 18, 1996). The President had the option of postponing the effective
date of the bill which was August 1, 1996, for six months. On July 16, 1996, the President
decided not to postpone it, although he did exercise his option to suspend one of the most con-
troversial sections of the Act-the right to bring suit-for six months. See Clinton Delays Law-
suits Under Title III of Helms-Burton, 13 INT'L TRADE REP. 1158, July 17, 1996.
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lenge several of the Act's provisions under Chapter 20 of NAFTA."
Although the European Union was "deeply troubled" over the Act, it
waited to announce its intentions.29 Nonetheless, one month after the
President signed the bill, the EU formally protested." In addition, Cu-
ba has also attacked the Act in the World Trade Organization
III. THE HELMS-BURTON ACT'S PROFIIBITION ON PRODUCTS
IMPORTED FROM CUBA AND ITS APPLICATION TO NAFTA AND GATT
Subchapter I of the Helms-Burton Act, unlike Subchapters III and
IV, addresses several topics.32 But it is § 6040 of Article I that possi-
bly violates NAFTA and GATT. That section continues the United
States' long standing policy33 of prohibiting the importation of any
product that originated in Cuba. Section 6040
prohibits the entry of, and dealings outside the United States in, merchandise
that... is of Cuba origin; ... is or has been located in or transported
28. See U.S. Agrees to Talk with Canada, Mexico, on Helms-Burton Sanctions Measures,
13 INT'L TRADE REP. 476 (1996). Chapter 20 of NAFTA covers Dispute Settlement Procedures.
29. European Union May Not File WTO Case Against U.S. Over Cuba Bill, Aide Says, 13
INT'L TRADE REP. 560 (1996).
30. See EU Protests Helms-Burton Law, Asks U.S. to Delay Implementation, 13 INT'L
TRADE REP. 682 (1996). The EU delivered a formal complaint to the President on April 16,
1996, asking the President to delay implementation of the Act.
31. See Cuba Renews WTO Attack on U.S. Bill Aimed at Curbing Foreign Investment, 13
INT'L TRADE REP. 647(1996). The Cubans argue that the Act "violates the Uruguay Round
provisions on most-favored-nation treatment to other countries, the agreement on Trade-Related
Investment Measures, and the agreement reached last year on liberalizing financial services."
32. Section 6034 opposes Cuba's membership in international financial institutions; Section
6036 denies assistance to the independent states of the former Soviet Union for assisting Cuba
militarily with Cuba's Cienfuegos nuclear facility; Section 6039 supports democratic and human
rights groups and international observers; Section 6041 withholds assistance to foreign countries
supporting Cuba's Juragua nuclear plant; and Section 6046 condemns Cuba's attack on the
civilian aircraft.
33. See The Cuban Liberty And Democratic Solidarity Act, 141 CONG. REc. S17097-02,
S17098. The United States embargo against Cuba started in 1962 with Proclamation 3447
which was pursuant to the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961. See Proclamation 3447, 27 Fed.
Reg. 1085 (1962). See also Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, 75 Stat. 445. Also, the Cuban
Assets Control Regulations codifies the embargo. It states that:
no person subject to the jurisdiction of the United States may purchase, trans-
port, import, or otherwise deal in or engage in any transaction with respect to
any merchandise outside the United States if such merchandise... [ius of
Cuban origin.... or has been located in or transported from or through Cu-
ba,... or [i]s made or derived in whole or in part of any article which is the
growth, produce, or manufacture of Cuba. Cuban Assets Control Regulations
31 C.F.R. § 515.204 (1996).
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through Cuba; or... is made or derived in whole or in part of any article
which is the growth, produce, or manufacture of Cuba. 4
Critics of the Act argue that it is extraterritorial in nature and amounts
to a secondary boycott against Cuba.35 But there are also International
law experts who feel the Act is not a secondary boycott.
3 6
A. Canada and Mexico's Complaint Under NAFTA
Although neither Canada nor Mexico have officially announced
what articles of NAFTA that § 6040 violates, they will probably argue
that it is inconsistent with Chapter 3, Article 309(1) of NAFFA. That
article denies a NAFTA member the right to prohibit the importation of
a good from another country. Article 309(1), in pertinent part, states:
Except as otherwise provided in the Agreement, no Party may adopt or main-
tain any prohibition or restriction on the importation of any good of another
Party.... except in accordance with Article XI of the GATT.. ..
Since § 6040 clearly denies Canada and Mexico the right to import any
product that ever touched Cuban soil, it would appear § 6040 violates
Article 309(1). But Article 309(3)(a) gives the United States the right to
prohibit the importation of a good from a member if that good came
from a non-member and the United States prohibits the importation of
that good directly. The article states that:
[iun the event that a Party adopts or maintains a prohibition or restriction on
the importation from or exportation to a non-Party of a good, nothing in this
Agreement shall be construed to prevent the Party from... limiting or pro-
hibiting the importation from the territory of another Party of such good of
that non-Party.... ."
And the United States does prohibit the importation of sugar from Cu-
ba.39 Thus, since the United States prohibits the importation of goods
directly from Cuba, it can prohibit their importation through Canada or
Mexico without violating Article 309(1).
34. CLDS, supra note 2, § 6040(a)(1-3).
35. See e.g., Debra Beachy, Sanctions on Cuba Rile Mexico, Europe/But U.S. Trade too
Important to Lose, Hous. CHRoN., May 31, 1996, available in 1996 WL 5601734, at 2.
Malcolm Rifkind, Britain's Foreign Minister, stated that "[nlo one country has the right to tell
companies in another country how they should behave in third countries."
36. Monroe Leigh claims that it is not a secondary boycott since the law does not interfere
with the affairs of a foreign nation; rather it merely creates a private cause of action for those
whose confiscated property is being used by foreign companies. Remarks of Monroe Leigh,
June 24, 1996, at 16 (unpublished manuscript, on file with author).
37. NAFTA, supra note 7, ch. 3, art. 309(1).
38. NAFFA, supra note 7, ch. 3, art. 309(3)(a).
39. See Cuban Assets Control Regulations, supra note 12.
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B. The EU's Complaint Under GA7T
The EU, unlike Canada and Mexico, most likely has a valid com-
plaint concerning § 6040. The EU has been vocal in its opposition to
this section, calling it a secondary boycott.' There are several articles
of GATI which the EU may argue the Act violates. Although the EU
has not officially stated what their arguments are, it has publicly de-
clared that the Act violates GATT, Articles I, 11, V, XI, and XIT; 4' all
of the violations apply to § 6040 of the Act.42 The British Government
has announced its opposition to the Act and has stated that the Act "is a
straightforward attempt to interfere in the commercial decisions of
foreign companies about the sourcing of raw materials."'43 "[If enact-
ed, it would represent a prima facie breach of US obligations under the
WTO. ... specifically of Article XI of the GATT, which prohibits the
imposition of new quantitative restrictions by any member country on
imports from another."'
Article I of GATT pertains to Most-Favored-Nation (MFN) status,
and although MFN status appears in several articles of GATT, it is
Article I that contains the major non-discriminatory clause.45 With
respect to importation, the article provides that
any advantage, favour, privilege, or immunity granted by any contracting
party to any product originating in or destined for any other country shall be
accorded immediately and unconditionally to the like product (emphasis add-
ed) originating in or destined for the territories of all other contracting par-
ties.'
In essence, "Most-Favored-Nation status prohibits discrimination obsta-
cles to trade by providing that, in general, no member country is to be
accorded treatment less favorable than that accorded to any other mem-
ber country."'47
Most likely, the EU will argue that the Helms-Burton Act is dis-
criminatory against "like products." 8 That article prohibits any dis-
40. See Beachy, supra note 35, at 2; Leigh, supra note 36, at 16.
41. See European Delegation of the European Union Commission to the United States, EU
Requests Consultation with the US on the Helms-Burton Legislation, EU DELEGATION OF THE
EuR. COMM'N TO THE U.S. PRESS RELEASE, May 3, 1996.
42. The EU has not stated that these apply to § 6040, but they cannot apply to
§ 6082--dealing with the confiscation of property--or § 6091 dealing with denial of visas.
43. Aide Memoire, British Embassy Washington, July 13, 1995, at 2 (on file with author).
44. Id.
45. See JOHN JACKSON, WORLD TRADE AND THE LAW OF GATT 258 (1969).
46. GATT, supra note 8, art. 1(1).
47. Kenneth L. Bachman, et al., Anti-Cuba Sanctions May Violate NAFTA, GATT; Provi-
sions of the Helms-Burton Bill Penalizing Dealers in Seized Property Would Impede Trade,
NAT'L L. J., Mar. 11, 1996, at C3.
48. GATT, supra note 8, art. I(1).
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crimination based on the country of origin against "like products." The
Act allows sugar, for instance, with its origin from an EU member to
enter the United States, but not sugar from Cuba. The Act also prohibits
an EU member from exporting chocolate with Cuban sugar in it to the
United States, since the sugar in the chocolate is a characteristic of the
product. Several cases suggest that a member may discriminate against
a product based on its characteristics, but not on the characteristics of
the "country of origin."49 But the Act prohibits the importation of sug-
ar, or any product, that originates from Cuba. Thus, the Act discrimi-
nates only on a characteristic of the product from an EU member, and
not on the characteristic of the originating EU member. Arguably, then,
it appears that the EU does not have a valid argument to challenge
§ 6040 under GATT Article I.
Article XI of GATT provides that no member shall restrict the
importation of goods through "quotas, import or export licenses or other
measures.""0 Specifically, the article states that:
No prohibitions or restrictions other than, duties, or other charges, whether
made effective through quotas, import or export license or other measures
(emphasis added), shall be instituted or maintained by any contracting party
on the importation of any product of the territory of any other contracting
party or on the exportation or sale for export of any product destined for the
territory of any other contracting party."
There are exceptions to this, but § 6040 of the Act does not fit within
any of them. 2 Most likely, § 6040 falls within the "other measures"
language of Article XI. The United States restricts the importation of
Cuban goods through legislation which is "other measures" and violates
GATT Article XI.
The EU also mentioned in its request for formal consultation with
the United States that § 6040 violates Article XIII.53 Article XIII states
in relevant part:
No prohibition or restriction shall be applied by any contracting party on the
importation of any product of the territory of any other contracting party ....
49. JACKSON, supra note 45, at 259. One case involved a French internal tax that targeted
automobiles with "large horsepower, which allegedly turned out to be almost exclusively United
States made."
50. GATI, supra note 8, art. XI(l).
51. Id.
52. GAT, supra note 8, art. XI(2)(a), (b), and (c)(I-H). One exception, Article XI(b)(2),
does allow a member to prohibit the importation of a good that is a commodity and the reason
for the prohibition is for its regulation for its classification, grading, or marketing." Even though
the United States requires importers of sugar to certify that it is not from Cuba, this certification
process does not fall within "classification, grading, or marketing." Thus, the exception does not
apply.




unless the importation of the like product of all third countries... is similar-
ly prohibited or restricted."
The Helms-Burton Act applies not only to all members, it applies to all
non-members also; it applies to every nation. The Act does not single
out any "contracting party." Thus, since the Act does not prohibit only
EU members from importing products made with Cuban sugar, the EU
does not have a valid argument that § 6040 violates Article XIII.
Another provision of GATT that the EU claims the Act violates is
Article [I.! Article 1II(l) states that, "The contracting parties recog-
nize that.., laws ... should not be applied to imported or domestic
products so as to afford protection to domestic products." 6 In addition,
Article 111(7) states that:
No internal quantitative regulation relating to the mixture, processing, or use
of products in specified amounts or proportions shall be applied in. such a
manner as to allocate any such amount or proportion among extemal sources
of supply."'
This is not required by the Act. The French, Germans, or English can
put as much of their sugar as they want in their products. In addition,
the Act does not prohibit a United States manufacturer from using
goods that contain one hundred percent of imported sugar. The only
limitation is that a country cannot use Cuban sugar to make their prod-
uct if they ultimately want to import that product into the United States.
Although the EU may argue that the Act's residual effect is that its
member's products will be prohibited from entering the United States, it
is a stretch to argue that the Act's aim is to protect domestic production
of sugar.
The purpose of GATT Article III appears to prohibit members from
discriminating against imported items that a United States manufacturer
will use to produce a final good. And Article III(1) also prohibits any
internal tax or regulation that protects domestic production. Section
6040 only prohibits products that originated from Cuba, which is con-
sistent with longstanding United States laws. 8 This includes ingredi-
ents in products also. Section 6040 merely prohibits an EU member
from importing an item that includes Cuban sugar. For instance, a Ger-
man chocolate manufacture would violate the section if it exported to
the United States its chocolate made with Cuban sugar that a United
States manufacturer would use in its product. Thus, since the United
54. GATT, supra note 8, art. XIII(1).
55. See European Delegation of the European Union Commission to the United States,
supra note 41.
56. GATT, supra note 8, art. m(1).
57. GATT, supra note 8, art. m(7).
58. See Cuban Assets Control Regulations 31 C.F.R. § 515.204 (1996).
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States did not enact a "law" to protect the domestic production of sug-
ar.--or any other item that Cuba produces-arguably § 6040 does not
violate Article III of GATT.
Another article of GATT that the EU will challenge § 6040 with is
Article V, which provides for the "freedom of transit."'  Article V
states that:
[t]here shall be freedom of transit through the territory of each contracting
party, via the routes most convenient for international transit, for traffic to or
from the territory of the other contracting parties. No distinction shall be
made which is based... on the place of origin, departure, . . . or on any
circumstances relating to the ownership of goods, of vessels or of means of
transport."'
The EU has a valid argument that § 6040 violates GA7Fr, Article V,
since that article states that a member cannot discriminate based on the
"ownership of goods, of a vessel." Section 6040 of the Act prohibits
any good that "has been located in or transported from or through Cu-
ba." Again, although the United States has prohibited this since
1963,63 it appears that this section violates Article V because it will
not allow a vessel carrying goods from Cuba to enter the United States.
GATT also provides that any law enacted prior to GATT shall not be
affected. However, the United States promulgated the Cuban Assets
Control Act in 1963 which essentially prohibits the same conduct pro-
hibited in § 6040. Thus, since the United States had in force a law
virtually identical to § 6040 prior to GATT, § 6040 does not violate
Article V.
IV. THE POTENTIAL VIOLATIONS OF NAFTA AND GATT UNDER
SECTION 6082 OF THE HELMS-BURTON ACT
Canada, Mexico, and the EU have also raised concerns over § 6082
of the Helms-Burton Act." That section provides that:
[A]ny person that ... traffics in property which was confiscated by the Cu-
ban government.., shall be liable to any United States national who owns
the claim to such property for money damages in an amount equal to ... the
59. No language in the Act can reasonably be interpreted to suggest that the United States'
motive was to protect the domestic production of sugar.
60. GATT, supra note 8, art. V(2).
61. Id.
62. CLDS, supra note 2, § 6040(a)(1-2).
63. The United States Congress promulgated the Cuban Assets Control Regulations on July
9, 1963 which has language similar to § 6040 of the CLDS. See Cuban Assets Control Regula-
tions, supra note. 12.
64. (Canadian) Government Announces Measures to Oppose U.S. Helms-Burton Act, DEF'r.
OF FOREIGN AFF. AND INT'L TRADE: NEws RELEASE, June 17, 1996, at 2. EU Formally Ques-
tions U.S. Policy Toward Cuba, Requests WTO Procedure, 13 INT'L TRADE REP. 719 (1996).
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fair market value of that property... [plus] court costs and reasonable
attorneys' fees.'
Although the section's main objective is to discourage foreign invest-
ment,6 it attempts to meet that objective by protecting the property
rights' of Americans whose property Castro confiscated in Cuba.
Since the demise of the Soviet Union, Fidel Castro has attempted to
boost Cuba's economy by allowing foreign investment.' In fact, the
Cuban Government has encouraged foreign investment through legisla-
tion.'
But § 6082 aims to prevent such foreign investment in Cuba. For
example, the Act provides that if a Canadian invests in property that a
United States national claims was expropriated by the Cuban Govern-
ment, that national can bring a cause of action against the Canadian
investor. The section states that "any person that... traffics in property
which was confiscated by the Cuban Government on or after January 1,
1959, shall be liable to any United States national who owns the claim
to such property for money damages ... ,70 Moreover, if a Canadian
merely benefits from confiscated property, the Canadian can be liable
because the Act also states that:
[A] person "traffics" in confiscated property if that person knowingly and
intentionally... engages in a commercial activity using or otherwise bene-
fitting from confiscated property ...."'
So, for example, if a Canadian "knowingly and intentionally" purchased
Cuban sugar grown on expropriated property, the U.S. national who
owned it could have a cause of action since the U.S. national could
argue that the Canadian benefitted from the confiscated property.
65. CLDS, supra note 2, § 6082(a)(1)(A)(i-ii).
66. H.R. CorNF. REP. No. 104-468 (1996).
67. CLDS, supra note 2, § 6081(1). The title recognizes that Americans have a "fundamen-
tal right to own and enjoy property .
68. The idea came from Jonathan R. Ratchik, Cuban Liberty and the Democratic Solidarity
Act of 1995, 11 AM. U. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 343 (1996).
69. See Cuba Allows More Foreign Investment, THE NEWS AND OBSERVER, Sept. 7, 1995,
at A15. Cuba passed legislation that allows foreign investors to have one hundred percent own-
ership in an enterprise. Prior to that, a foreigner could own only forty-nine percent. This is a
drastic break from traditional socialist doctrine. It is modeled similarly to Vietnam and China's
models of socialist economies. There is still "a one party state" with strong elements of a free
market economy.
70. CLDS, supra note 2, § 6082(a)(1).
71. CLDS, supra note 2, § 6023(13)(A)(ii).
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A. Canada and Mexico's Potential Argument that Section 6082
Violates NAFTA
Although neither Canada nor Mexico have announced what chapter
of NAFTA § 6082 violates, it appears their best argument arises from
Chapter 11. As quoted above, § 6082 allows "any U.S. national who
owns a claim" to confiscated property to bring a cause of action against
a foreigner who trafficks or benefits from it.72 The problem is that Ar-
ticle 1105 of NAFTA "provides that each country must also accord
NAFTA investors treatment in accordance with international law."'73
And under international law, it is axiomatic that a country cannot "in-
tervene in foreign expropriation of property not belonging to... [its]
nationals." This is especially significant, as in this instance, when the
country-Cuba--confiscated property that belonged to its own citizen;
that is considered domestic in nature.74
Opponents argue that if the Act provided for a cause of action only
for United States citizens who were United States nationals at the time
of the taking, then § 6082 would arguably not violate NAFTA; howev-
er, the section contains no such restrictions. It allows any United States
national, including Cuban-Americans who were not United States citi-
zens when their property was expropriated, to sue a foreign investor.
Thus, it does appear that this section of the Act violates NAFTA. If the
Act allowed only those United States nationals who were United States
citizens when their property was confiscated to sue and prohibit Cuban-
Americans who were not United States citizens at the time of the taking
to sue, then the section would appear not to violate NAFTA.5
B. No Potential Complaint From the EU Under GAYT
Like Canada and Mexico, the EU also realizes that § 6082 could
"lead to legal chaos for businessmen investing in, or doing business
with the U.S.A.,"7 6 and it is troubled by it.77 However, the EU also
realizes that "[r]ecourse to the WTO can ... only address" those as-
72. CLDS, supra note 2, § 6082(a)(1).
73. North American Free Trade Agreement Implementation Act, available in 1993 WL
561159, at 2.
74. See Bachman, supra note 47, at 2.
75. See Ratchik, supra note 68, at 361. In his article on the Helms-Burton Act, Jonathan R.
Ratchik states that if the Act did not allow Cuban-Americans who were not United States citi-
zens when their property was confiscated to bring a cause of action, it would violate the United
States Supreme Court's holding in Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967) (all United States citi-
zens must have equal protection regardless of their nationality).
76. Eric Hayes, The Helms Burton Law: Its Influence on Foreign Economic Interests in
Cuba, Address Before Casa de America, Madrid, Spain (May 6, 1996) (on file with author).
77. Id. The EU, like Canada, claims that Title I violates the basic principles of interna-
tional law under the "rule on nationality of claims."
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pects of the Act dealing with trade.7" Thus, the EU cannot rely on
GAT" to resolve any conflict it has with Section 6082 of the Helms-
Burton Act. 9
V. SECTION 6091 OF THE HELMS-BURTON ACT's INCONSISTENCIES
wlTH NAFTA AND GATT
Another area of concern for Canada, Mexico, and the EU is
§ 6091. The section is far-reaching in that it dictates that the Secretary
of State shall deny a visa to... any alien who . . . has confiscated...
property a claim to which is owned by a United States national, or
converts or has converted for personal gain confiscated property, a
claim to which is owned by a United States national; ... traffics in
confiscated property; ... is a corporate officer, principle, or shareholder
with a controlling interest of an entity which has been involved in the
confiscation of property or trafficking in confiscated property... ; or is
a spouse, minor child, or agent of a person [mentioned above].'
A. Canada and Mexico's Potential Argument that Section 6091 of the
Helms-Burton Act Violates NAFTA
Most likely, Canada and Mexico's main argument will come from
Chapter 16 of NAFTA, specifically Article 1603. That article states
that, "[e]ach party shall grant temporary entry to business persons who
are otherwise qualified for entry under applicable measures relating to
public health and safety and national security, in accordance with this
Chapter, including the provisions of Annex 1603."'" Annex 1603 re-
quires that temporary entry should be granted if "the business person
otherwise complies with existing immigration" laws. 2
Although the term "existing" has a different meaning between
Mexico and the United States versus Canada and the United States,83
for both, the law had to have been "existing" when NAFTA took ef-
fect." In addition, Article 16 does not provide for any exceptions that
the Act covers. Thus, since the Helms-Burton Act did not exist prior to
NAFTA taking effect, it appears that in either case § 6091 is not con-
78. Id. The statement also mentioned that the EU will rely on GATS to challenge Title IV.
79. See Hayes, supra note 76, at 3. The EU and its members are considering blocking
statutes or anti-boycott legislation.
80. CLDS, supra note 2, § 6091(a)(1-4).
81. NAFTA, supra note 7, art. 1603(1).
82. NAFTA, supra note 7, ch. 16, Annex 1603(A)(1), (C)(1), and (D)(1).
83. NAFTA, supra note 7, ch. 16, Annex 1608. As between Mexico and the United States,
"existing" refers to those immigration laws in effect on the date of entry into force of NAFTA.
As between Canada and the United States, "existing" refers to those immigration laws in effect
on January 1, 1989.
84. NAFTA went into force January 1, 1994.
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sistent with Article 16." But the United States can argue that the sec-
tion "is not an absolute prohibition on temporary entry," 6 since it only
applies to foreigners who "[traffic] in confiscated property of United
States nationals."" Once the foreigner ceases to traffic in confiscated
property, the prohibition is removed; so it is not permanent and it only
applies to specific foreigners, not foreigners of a specific nation.
B. The EU's Potential Argument that Section 6091 of the Helms-
Burton Act Violates GATT
Since GATT does not protect its members from the adverse immi-
gration sanctions of § 6091, most likely, the EU will rely on the Gen-
eral Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS) to complain of the
provisions of § 6091." Article II of GATS provides that:
With respect to any measure covered by this agreement, each member shall
accord immediately and unconditionally to service and service suppliers of
any other Member treatment no less favourable than that it accords to like
service suppliers of any other country.'
In addition, Article XVII states that a member-here the United
States-treats service and service suppliers of another member the same
as it treats its own service and service suppliers.9' Thus, the EU may
argue that the United States violates these provisions because it will
deny entry to a service supplier who profits from property confiscated
from American nationals by Castro.
For several reasons these arguments will fail. First, Article II of
GATS merely states that the United States must treat all members
equally, and it does. Under the Helms-Burton Act any service or service
supplier who profits from property confiscated in Cuba cannot enter the
United States.' Thus, § 6091 of the Helms-Burton Act treats all ser-
85. If the United States enacts the Helms-Burton Act, Canada has blocking legislation that
prohibits Canadian "companies from complying with such far-reaching American laws." Mexi-
co, Canada Criticize U.S. Over Law, ST. Louis POST-DISPATCH, June 16, 1996, available in
1996 WL 2774777, at 1.
86. Stuart E. Benson, et al., The North American Free Trade Agreement Legal Issues
Raised By The Helms-Burton Act, at 26 (1996) (unpublished memorandum, on file with au-
thor).
87. Id. at 26.
88. The General Agreement on Trade in Services, Apr. 15, 1994, 33 I.L.M. 1168 (1994)
[hereinafter GATS].
89. See European Delegation of the European Union Commission to the United States,
supra note 41, at 1.
90. GATS, supra note 88, art. 11(1).
91. GATS, supra note 88, art. XVII(1). "[E]ach Member shall accord to services and ser-
vice suppliers of any other Member, in respect of all measures affecting the supply of services,
treatment no less favourable than that it accords to its own like services and service suppliers."
92. CLDS, supra note 2, § 6091(a)(1-3).
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vice providers equally. The United States, under § 6091, will not deny
a visa to a service provider based on that provider's nationality or the
service provided. There is no less favorable treatment to a provider
from one country than a provider from another. But if a provider of
services benefits from or traffics in property that Castro confiscated
from a United States national, then that provider cannot enter the Unit-
ed States regardless of nationality. Thus, § 6091 does not appear to
violate GATS Article II.
In addition, Article XVII states that the United States only has to
treat member service providers like it treats its own;93 and the Helms-
Burton Act does. The Act states that:
[E]ach member shall accord to services and service suppliers of any other
Member, in respect of all measures affecting the supply of services, treatment
no less favourable than that it accords to its own like services and service
suppliers.""
In fact, one could argue that Americans are treated less favorably than
their EU counterpart. Americans are not only prohibited from owning
or benefiting from any confiscated property, but are prohibited from
owning any property in Cuba.95 In contrast, EU members may own
Cuban property; they are merely prohibited from entering the United
States if it is property that Castro confiscated from a United States na-
tional. Plus, the GATS Statement of Administrative Action states that
"treatment that skews the conditions of competition in favor of domes-
tic services or service suppliers is considered to be 'less
favourable."'" This section does not "skew" conditions in favor of the
United States. And although this is not the only way of violating the
article, the GATS' framers intent was to prevent the passing of laws
that discriminated against another member. Thus, § 6091 seems to com-
ply with GATS Article XVII. To comply with GATS, all that the
United States must do is notify the WTO of the Helms-Burton Act.98
93. GATS, supra note 88, art. XVII(1). "[Elach member shall accord to services and ser-
vice suppliers of any other Member, in respect of all measures affecting the supply of services,
treatment no less favourable than that it accords to its own like services and service suppliers."
94. Id.
95. Cuban Assets Control Regulations, 31 C.F.R. § 515.560(f) (1996).
96. The Uruguay Round Agreements Act Statement of Administrative Action, available in
1994 WL 761795, at 6.
97. GATS, supra note 88, art. XVII(2). States that a member must treat service suppliers of
another member identically to the way it accords treatment to its own like service suppliers.
98. GATS, supra note 88, art. II(1)-(2). "Each Member shall... promptly... inform the
Council for Trade in Services of the introduction of any new, or any changes to existing, laws,
regulations or administrative guidelines which significantly affect trade in services covered by
its specific commitments under this Agreement."
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VI. THE UNITED STATES' DEFENSE TO ANY VIOLATION OF NAFTA
OR GATT
Whether the Helms-Burton Act violates any of the above men-
tioned provisions of NAFTA or GATT could be irrelevant. Both
NAFTA and GATT have a national security interest exception, Chapter
21 and Article XXI, respectively. These provisions allow a member to
pass legislation that is inconsistent with those agreements for national
security reasons.
A. The United States' Response to a Violation of NAFTA Using
NAFTA Chapter 21
NAFTA Chapter 21, Article 2102 provides that a party can pass
legislation for national security interest for an emergency dealing with
international relations." Under Article 2102, a "government may take
action that would otherwise be inconsistent with the NAFrA in order to
protect its essential security interests."'" This exception is "self-judg-
ing" and "each government would expect the provision to be applied by
the other in good faith."'' But since NAFFA is relatively new, none
of its members has yet to claim a national security interest. Thus,
whether the United States can validly claim a national security interest
depends on whether it passed the Helms-Burton Act "to protect its
'essential' security interest."' 2 In the Act it explicitly states that Cas-
tro is a threat to "international peace and security"' 3 and that he has
"posed a national security threat to the United States" for the past thir-
ty-six years.'" Since claimed exceptions are self-judging, another
NAFTA member cannot dispute an exception unless they argue that the
United States passed it in bad faith. Moreover, the United States does
not benefit from the Act, so a challenger will have a difficult time
showing that the United States passed the Act in bad faith. If a NAFTA
dispute panel finds that the United States violated NAFTA with the
passage of the Helms-Burton Act, then most likely the United States
can successfully invoke a national security interest exception under
Chapter 21.
99. NAFTA, supra note 7, ch. 21, art. 2102(b)(ii). "[Nothing in this Agreement shall be
construed... to prevent any party from taking any actions that it considers necessary for the
protection of its essential security interests.., taken [for an] ... emergency in international
relations ......




103. CLDS, supra note 2, § 6021(14).
104. CLDS, supra note 2, § 6021(28).
[Vol. 4:361
HELMS-BURTON ACT
B. The United States' Response to a Violation of GAIT Using Chapter
21 of GATT
Even though the Helms-Burton Act violates some of the GATT
articles mentioned above, the United States has two options. First, it
can ask for a waiver, which is unlikely, or it can claim that the Act
falls within the security exception of Article XXI.' °
In order for the United States to obtain a waiver in Cuba's MFN
status, a three-fourths majority is required."° That is unlikely to hap-
pen, however, since virtually every member has raised concerns over its
passage. The United States' best option is to claim that it passed the
Act in the name of national security."7 The United States has used
the national security interest in the past to suspend MFN treatment."
Fortunately for the United States, the GAIT panel"°' that reviews the
exception "has decided that the underlying justification for a claim of
the national security exception will not be questioned.""' Critics of
Article XXI claim that it is overbroad and that the United States uses it
for political purposes."' Regardless, it appears that the United States
can "successfully invoke the national security exception under GATT
Article XXI,"" in its attempt to undermine Castro's regime.
105. GATS, supra note 88, art. XXI(b)(iii). It states that, "Nothing in the Agreement shall be
construed ... to prevent any contracting party from taking any action which it considers neces-
sary for the protection of its essential security interests ... taken in ... [an] emergency in
international relations .... "
106. Likelihood of a GATT Challenge to an Embargo on Iran, 141 CoNG. RkrC. S17097-02,
at S17099.
107. Cuban Liberty and Democratic Solidarity Act, 141 CONG. REC. H9328-02, H9344.
Opponents in the United States Congress claim that the United States cannot justify a national
security interest because "Cuban troops are out of Africa; Cuba is no longer supporting revolu-
tionary movements; and its military ties to Russia are virtually non-existent and certainly, not a
threat to the United States."
108. See Likelihood of a GATT Challenge to an Embargo on Iran, supra note 106, at
S17098. In fact, some members of the GAIT feel that the United States has used the exception
excessively.
109. Richard Sutherland Whitt, The Politics of Procedure: An Examination of the GAIT
Dispute Settlement Panel and the Article XXI Defense in the Context of the U.S. Embargo of
Nicaragua, 19 LAW & POL'Y INT'L BUS. 603, 609 (1987) (A dispute does not go before the
panel unless all "other efforts to resolve the dispute are unsuccessful." Once the panel is
formed, "[elach party to the dispute makes written and oral arguments to the panel, which are
subject to rebuttal." Traditionally the panel report has been unanimous. "Since 1948, it is esti-
mated that over one hundred GATT complaint proceedings have been instigated; of these,
roughly half have led to the submission of a report by the panel.").
110. Likelihood of a GAIT Challenge to an Embargo on Iran, supra note 106, at S 17099.
The panel made this decision when it reviewed Nicaragua's challenge to an embargo imposed
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VII. CONCLUSION
The United States in its continuing attempt to oust Castro has defi-
nitely caused an uproar. Although the United States had good inten-
tions, it may have violated some provisions of multilateral agreements
that it freely entered into, particularly those provisions of NAFTA and
GATT dealing with the free flow of trade and free movement of service
suppliers of member countries. However, the United States did not
relinquish its sovereignty when it signed NAFTA and GAT. And al-
though the United States may suffer retaliation from the members of
these agreements, the United States will do what is in its best interest.
Since the President postponed, for a second time," 3 the effective
date of the most controversial section until July 1, 1997, the Act can
still be repealed or revised. But the Act should not be repealed and any
revisions should be minimal. The Act's objective is to get Castro out of
Cuba, thereby eliminating any threat he causes to the United States and
giving the people of Cuba a chance to experience the democratic pro-
cess. If other countries recognize this objective as valid, the Act should
work. Although some of the provisions are extreme, they probably pro-
vide the most effective way of discouraging those-who want to invest in
Cuba from doing so: making them choose between doing business in
Cuba or the United States. Thus, if people want to make a profit in the
United States, they must accept that they cannot do it at the expense of
United States citizens whose property was confiscated. Nor can they
make a profit in this country as they assist Castro in perpetuating a sup-
pressive regime that threatens the security of the United States.
Brian J. Welke
113. See Clinton Extends His Suspension of Title III of Cuba Law; Canada Weighs NAFTA
Action, 14 INT'L TRADE REP. 42 (1997). The President fust suspended Subchapter 1U on August
1, 1997, and again on Jan. 1, 1997.
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